Introduction
The trend toward outsourcing outside of manufacturing, which has been emblazoned in the newspaper headlines and magazine covers in recent years, started with software development. Long before there were reports about accounting and research and development (R&D) jobs moving from the United States to developing countries such as India and China, software was the story. The predominant reason for the movement of such knowledge work jobs, including software-related, is labor costs. With large and growing numbers of highly educated and technically adept scientists and engineers in low labor cost countries, and plummeting costs for high speed telecommunications infrastructure that allows for instantaneous communication around the globe, the allure of being able to develop and produce the same product at lower costs has been too tempting for many companies to resist.
This chapter analyzes the experience of one company that has moved extensively to take advantage of lower labor costs for technical talent by spreading its software R&D work worldwide. The research issues addressed are (a) whether there are differences in performance between the company's software development sites in the United States, Western Europe, and other countries; (b) the factors leading to those differences; (c) the company's rationale for locating software development work in those locations; and (d) the future prospects for software development work at those locations.
Alec Levenson
The motivation for the research comes from the Sloan Foundation's desire to better understand productivity differences in the United States and Western Europe. After focusing on economy-wide and industry-wide differences in productivity that have left many questions unanswered, the current focus is on within-company differences: comparing two sites within the same organization that produce similar outputs on different continents, are there productivity differences and, if so, why? The company in question has sites in both the United States and France, and thus appeared to be an ideal candidate for studying such differences.
In the case of software development, the work that is done at "remote" sites (i.e., away from the headquarters of a company) often is a component of a larger product, which certainly was the case for the company that formed the basis for this case study. Thus, fully understanding site-level productivity differences requires analyzing the company's decisions to locate work remotely, not just in France but in other sites doing development work for the same set of products on which the U.S. and French teams worked. This meant expanding the scope of the study to include sites in the Czech Republic and India.
Because of interdependencies in the components produced at the remote sites, measuring productivity at the site level proved to be quite difficult. Should productivity be measured on the basis of meeting project goals for timeliness, cost, and design specifi cations for a particular component? Should it be measured based on the ability of the project integration teams to get the component to work seamlessly with the software? Is it possible to have site-level productivity measures when the fi nal product is produced from components that are combined across sites? A framework for addressing these issues was derived from the organizational behavioral literature on teams and distributed work. The analysis focused on the tradeoffs between closer access to customers and markets, wage cost savings from locating the work in lower labor cost locations, and increased coordination and integration costs from distributing software development globally. Because of the challenges involved, the research used measures of self-reported effectiveness measured with respect to group-level objectives, derived from a survey administered to the group members, and from interviews conducted with both managers and employees at the sites. The combination of survey and interview data provides a detailed case study of the issues involved in distributing software R&D work across the United States, Western Europe, and less-developed countries.
Previous Literature
While economists are the intended audience for this chapter, the existing literature on which the research approach is based lies predominantly outside of economics. The reason for this is because economics has only fairly recently begun to model the internal working of organizations, with a primary focus on principal-agent and property rights issues that have implications for organization design, including the boundaries of the fi rm, the allocation of decision making, and the structuring of incentives within the fi rm. The decision issue in this case, however, deals primarily with aspects of job design and organization design that address what Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) call the challenges of differentiation and integration: which tasks in the R&D and production process should be differentiated as separate from each other and thus can be located in different parts of the organization both conceptually and potentially also physically, and which tasks need to be integrated (and thus are conceptually tightly linked) with potential implications for physical proximity as well.
While a detailed analysis of the economic and organizational behavioral literatures on organization design is well beyond the scope of this chapter, it is worth noting how economics does (and does not) address the issue of groups and teams within organizations. Economics typically focuses on issues of where decision making happens in organizations (e.g., centrally or decentralized). While groups are sometimes addressed, the groups that exist within economic models are collections of individuals whose actions aggregate to form a collective output with complete efficiency (Marschak and Radner 1972; Gibbons 2003) . In particular, "all team theoretic models share one key feature: they ignore the interests of the team members-there is no shirking, free-riding, lying, lobbying or strategizing of any kind . . . the organization is a machine; its parts can be designed (and their interactions controlled)" (Gibbons 2003, 761) . Unfortunately, anyone who has worked in groups, including academic departments, knows that these team theoretic models fall far short of describing the range of behaviors that exist and that impede efficiency in the real world.
The organizational behavioral literature, in contrast, has an entire discipline devoted to the study of groups and the difficulties in getting group members to behave in the ways the organization intends. Indeed, there are separate strands that focus, for example, on mandatory participation groups (often called teams) versus voluntary participation groups (called, among other things, social networks and learning networks). In these literatures, a group typically consists of three or more individuals, though two-person groups have been studied. 1 For an economist, the theoretical justifi cation for studying groups is grounded in specialization. Groups are the answer to this question: what happens when profi t maximization requires individuals to rely closely on 1 . The most common example of two-person groups from the teams literature is airline pilots. If the focus is expanded to include interactions between two individuals who are not peers, then there are entirely separate literatures on relationships that exist both as defi ned by the formal hierarchy of the fi rm (supervisor-subordinate relationships) and relationships that emerge voluntarily as a response to the organizational structure and individual's desire for outcomes such as career advancement (mentor relationships). the output of others (interdependence) and it is not feasible to assign full accountability for the overall product in piecemeal fashion? The traditional assembly line is a good example of interdependence: the ability of any assembly line worker to complete his or her task is directly tied to the actions of the worker immediately before him or her on the assembly line. Yet the traditional assembly line is not designed to assign accountability for the overall product to each individual worker, at least not in a profi t maximizing way. The problem is that defects in the overall product quality often are not detected until well after they have occurred in the production process. While an individual worker can be held accountable for performing a very narrow task, such as inserting a screw, the worker cannot be held accountable in a cost effective way if minor deviations in the quality of the work are revealed only after the complete product has been assembled.
Traditional economic models would posit the use of monitoring and monetary incentives to produce the desired outcome. Yet examples from the real world show that organizations often deal with the problem by focusing on outcomes that can be measured only at the group level, and that necessitate holding a collection of individuals jointly responsible for the group output. In the case of assembly lines, the team-based approach, which was pioneered by the Japanese auto manufacturers, has become a standard adopted in manufacturing around the world. In this approach, groups of workers are jointly responsible and held accountable for assembling parts (or all) of the car in a way that allows for internal quality control within the group that can be accurately verifi ed by others outside the group.
Other examples include the design of new products, which requires input from individuals with various specialized skill sets (engineering, marketing, design, fi nance, etc.), yet that also can only be measured as successful or not when the fi nal product is produced, and the piloting of large jet planes. In the new product case, if it fails in the marketplace, it may be due to the standalone contributions of individual team members falling short, or to the fact that the individuals did not properly work together (cross-functionally) in the design of the product. The former is a failure of contribution, which can be measured at the individual level; the latter is a failure of cooperation, which can be measured only at the group level and that might not be accurately assessed by someone external to the group. In the jet plane case, the fi rm does not need, neither is it optimal, to know how the pilot and copilot divide the fl ying tasks, so long as the plane reaches its destination safely. The problem from the fi rm's perspective is how to create the right set of incentives for the individuals in the group to work together to achieve the outcome. The answer, as the organizational behavioral literature has shown, often is to create a team (Hackman and Oldham 1980; Hackman 1987) .
According to the organizational behavioral literature, a team is "a collection of individuals who are interdependent in their tasks, who share responsibility for outcomes, who see themselves and are seen by others as an intact social entity embedded in one or more larger social systems (for example, business unit or the corporation), and who manage their relationships across organizational boundaries" (Cohen and Bailey 1997, 241) . For economists, the latter two parts of the defi nition require further explanation. An "intact social entity" is another way of saying that the members of the group have to interact with each other in often fl uid ways in order to accomplish the shared objectives. Having to "manage their relationships across organizational boundaries" means that traditional hierarchical approaches to organizing, evaluating, and rewarding individuals may not help, and might even hinder, achieving the group's objectives; successful performance may require ignoring or redefi ning those approaches.
Because economists typically prefer causal models, the prospects of focusing on fl uid social interactions and how relationships get managed raises the uncomfortable specter of endogeneity. As such, to the extent that economists have focused on team issues, it has been limited to looking for ways that nontraditional approaches to designing work can improve productivity, of which teams form a core element as in the auto assembly case described previously. These nontraditional approaches have been called both high performance work systems and innovative HR approaches, and typically are characterized by bundles of work practices that deviate from the norm found in the job design approach used in traditional assembly lines (e.g., Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Cappelli and Neumark 2001; Kochan et al. 1996; Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi 1997) . While there is some debate regarding the size of effects and the impacts on profi tability (Cappelli and Neumark 2001) , the economic and organizational behavioral literatures typically fi nd a positive correlation between the use of these bundles of work practices, including teams, and productivity. Beyond this, however, economics largely is silent with respect to the role that teams play in organizations.
One reason why economists have been persuaded regarding the importance of innovative human resource practices and teams is the empirical evidence that comes almost exclusively from manufacturing showing their impact on productivity. Yet the use of teams is pervasive throughout all segments of the economy, not just manufacturing (Cohen and Bailey 1997) . In knowledge-based work, which is a growing portion of all jobs, teams are useful in many contexts, including R&D and customer service and sales; and, in the extreme, teams can form the basic organizing principle for an entire organization (Mohrman, Cohen, Mohrman 1995) . In these settings, however, with the exception of sales, the types of productivity measures that economists prefer are difficult to impossible to come by.
The organizational behavioral literature on teams, in contrast, has spent much time wrestling with the issue of measuring productivity in settings where physical output measures are lacking. The most common approach is to survey the team members and others in the fi rm (supervisors, coworkers, customers, etc.) who are knowledgeable about the team's objectives and performance, asking them to rate the team on an "effectiveness" scalemeaning ability to accomplish the team's objectives. While such measures are more subjective than physical output measures, they have the advantage of enabling the rater to take into consideration organizational and external (market-based) factors that might otherwise confound effective comparison of outcomes for teams operating under different circumstances. Thus, a team that is hindered by unforeseen circumstances beyond its control could be rated more leniently than one that had smooth sailing. Similarly, any rating of effectiveness at achieving targets that can be measured using time or other counts (e.g., number of innovations) is done in relative terms, given that the rater should have a sense about how other people and teams should perform under comparable conditions. This means that effectiveness ratings can be very useful for comparing the drivers of performance across teams that have dissimilar and/ or multiple objectives.
In addition to the outcome measures, the organizational behavioral literature focuses heavily on identifying the team characteristics and intermediate factors that impact productivity (Gladstein 1984; Keller 1986; Campion, Medsker, and Higgs 1993; Straus and McGrath 1994; Campion, Papper, and Medsker 1996; Guzzo and Dickson 1996; Cohen and Bailey 1997; Janz, Colquitt, and Noe 1997) , factors that are not familiar to economists but that should appeal to economists' desires to better understand the black box of group dynamics. These include, but are hardly limited to, the measures used in this chapter, which are described in detail following.
In addition to the general factors that impact team effectiveness, the organizational behavioral literature recently has addressed the extent to which teams that operate in traditional settings (i.e., colocated) are different from teams that are geographically dispersed (i.e., one or more member is in a different location). A main focus of this literature is understanding how such geographically dispersed teams divide the work across locations, how they use technology to facilitate communication, and how time and distance impact team effectiveness (Hiltz, Johnson and Turoff 1986; Valacich et al. 1994; Saphiere 1996; Graetz et al. 1998; Cappel and Windsor 2000; McDonough, Kahn, and Barczak 2001; Schmidt, Montoya-Weiss, and Massey 2001; Bell and Kozlowski 2002; Driskell, Radtke, and Salas 2003; Gibson and Cohen 2003; Martins, Gilson, and Maynard 2004) .
Research Questions and Methods
The research issues addressed in this study are as follows: are there differences in performance between the company's software The research approach taken for this study is atypical of standard empirical economics studies that use existing data to test well-defi ned research questions. Rather, given the complexity of the work design, interdependencies across sites, and lack of existing data, the approach used elements of both "grounded theory" (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss 1987; Marshall and Rossman 1995) and case study methodology (Yin 2003) , which qualitative researchers in general and organizational behavior researchers in particular employ in situations such as this (Lee 1999) . Lee (1999) and Yin (2003) provide excellent reviews of and frameworks for applying the methodologies involved in such research; the interested reader is encouraged to start with those sources for in-depth details. For purposes of brevity, the discussion here will focus on the steps taken for this particular study, and how they relate to the guidelines provided by those literatures.
The fi rst step in the research process consisted of a review of the organizational behavioral literature on teams to identify the domain of factors that have been associated with team performance (see previous citations; Mohrman, Cohen, and Mohrman 1995; and Gibson and Cohen 2003) . The second step consisted of interviews with the senior leadership of the company to identify business units and sites that had operations in both the United States and Western Europe and that produced similar products. The interviews also focused on the nature of the work and interdependencies across sites, and the history behind the company's rationale for locating software development work in each site. The latter was used for conclusions about strategy, motivation for starting and maintaining work at the different sites, and prospects for continued work at the sites. The former was used to narrow the domain of questions to address in the site visits, along with the types of workers (jobs/ roles) to be interviewed during the site visits. The interview protocols addressed the following areas, using a semi-structured, open-ended format: Site visits were conducted in California, Texas, France, and the Czech Republic, and included interviews with both managers and development engineers. For the Norway and India sites, telephone interviews were conducted with the site managers. The interview results were used to defi ne the issues to be addressed in the survey, which was subsequently sent anonymously to all development engineers and on-site managers at each site. A copy of the survey and summary statistics for each question is in appendix B. Figure 7 .1 shows the model that was used to specify the regressions. It draws heavily from the work of Mohrman, Cohen, and Mohrman (1995) , Gibson and Cohen (2003) , and other contributions from the organizational behavioral literature on teams. There are three main parts of the model: (a) the group-related variables that are hypothesized to impact effectiveness ("effectiveness drivers"), (b) measures of the degree of distributed work, and (c) individual attitudes and intention to leave. The latter are included to investigate the impact that having team members located apart from each other may have on employees' satisfaction and desire to remain with the organization, potentially key issues in a knowledge work environment where turnover could negatively impact productivity. The model can be summarized using the following equations, which were used to guide the statistical analysis:
Team effectiveness ϭ f(effectiveness drivers, individual attitudes, degree of distributed work)
(2) Intention to leave ϭ g(individual attitudes, degree of distributed work)
These equations and the diagram in fi gure 7.1 have the implicit assumption that both team effectiveness and intention to leave the organization are caused by the other variables. There are long intellectual histories in both economics and organizational behavior that support that perspective. For example, trust is viewed by the organizational behavior literature as a key indicator that often precedes good group performance; in this view, trust among group members is a foundation upon which good performance is based (e.g., Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995; Rousseau et al. 1998; Saparito, Chen, and Sapienza 2004; Mayer and Gavin 2005; Krishnan, Martin, and Noorderhaven 2006; Langfred 2007; Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis 2007) . Within the economics literature, trust per se has been less of a focus than shirking in principal-agent, efficiency wage, and other models (e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; Bulow and Summers 1986; Radner 1992; Prendergast 1999) . In a group context, the absence of shirking could easily be conceptualized (and measured) as trust; viewed this way, many economic models support trust preceding performance.
In reality, however, it is reasonable to expect that there may be feedback loops from performance to employees' attitudes (the individual attitudes) and team processes, attitudes, and behaviors (the effectiveness drivers). For example, if team members are rewarded for their contributions only after the group's objectives have been achieved, their responses to the "individual and team rewards" construct questions could refl ect the impact of prior performance on their most recently received compensation.
2 Similarly, the levels At a practical level, the very high alpha (.90) for that construct in this sample indicates that the individual survey items that comprise the construct are all highly correlated. Thus, in the context of teams in this fi rm, rewards for individual performance appear to be very closely tied into rewards for group performance, and vice versa. of trust, intergroup cooperation, resource commitment by the organization, and so forth, may all improve in the wake of prior good performance; 3 indeed, this is the "virtuous spiral" that Lawler (2003) describes as common in high-performing organizations. The methodological issues involved in identifying causality in situations like this have been extensively addressed elsewhere (e.g., Cappelli and Neumark 2001) . For the present purpose of demonstrating the types of measurement that can be used in team-based settings, the intent of the analysis is to test for a statistical relationship, not determine causality. In that context, the previous simplifi ed equations are sufficient.
The data needed to estimate the model were collected using an online survey that was administered in 2004 to approximately 750 to 800 team members. The precise number of recipients is unknown because it was administered anonymously-the company distributed an e-mail request to all of the team members and on-site managers using an e-mail alias list that was not shared with the researchers. Valid responses were received from 204 people, for a response rate of approximately 25 to 30 percent. The company indicated that this response rate is consistent with their experience with other surveys. The respondents predominantly came from two of the three sites in California, France, the Czech Republic, and India. There were only a small number of respondents from the third site in California, Texas, and Norway, limiting the ability to draw direct inferences about these sites. At least one response was received from fi fteen unique teams, with thirteen teams providing at least fi ve responses per team.
The survey collected three measures of geographic dispersion: (a) location of the person, (b) distance of the respondents from their immediate supervisors (measured in number of time zones), and (c) whether the respondents regularly communicated with team members elsewhere (also measured in number of time zones). The latter were used to create dummy variables indicating the furthest distance from team members with whom the person interacted regularly. This person-specifi c measure of geographic dispersion was preferred to a team-level aggregate for two reasons. First, the interviews revealed that some of the teams included in the survey were predominantly colocated, with only a handful (sometimes only one or two) of members located elsewhere. Second, even within the highly geographically dispersed teams with, for example, no more than half their members at one location and the rest on different continents, many team members, according to the interviews, did not regularly communicate with other team members in far fl ung locations; this communication was typically reserved for the project lead or other team member playing a "lateral integrating role." Using a person-specifi c measure of geographic dispersion ensured that these differences in personal experience with distributed work were accurately refl ected in the data and analysis.
The attitudinal measures that the survey sought to measure were drawn predominantly from previous research on teams and distributed teams in the organizational behavioral literature. The standard approach when collecting attitudinal measures is to ask multiple questions designed to address the same concept, and then use factor and reliability analysis to verify that the individuals' responses to the separate questions are sufficiently correlated that they can be combined together in indexes (using simple averages of the individual questions). The results of the factor and reliability analysis produced the following measures ("constructs") for the regression analyses. The individual survey items that form each construct are detailed in appendix A. The results of the Oblimin-rotated exploratory factor analysis using Principal Axis Factoring 4 indicated that the items included in each construct factored with relatively high loadings within each construct and low cross-loadings across constructs (typically less than .3). The alphas from the reliability analyses 5 are reported in appendix A.
Trust:
Trust is supposed to be a key factor that measures whether team members can work together effectively in both colocated and distributed contexts.
2. Integration: Measures the extent to which team members who come from different disciplinary backgrounds can resolve their different perspectives.
3. Intergroup cooperation: The integration construct measures withinteam cooperation; this construct measures cooperation between functions and sites within the organization, which often go beyond the team members.
IT support:
Measures the extent to which the team members perceive the organization provides sufficient technology support. 4 . Broadly speaking, there are two types of "rotations" available to use when conducting exploratory factor analysis, both of which are designed to identify distinct groups of survey items that can be combined together based on common variance. Though there is a history of heated debate regarding the implicit assumptions underlying each approach, in practice both types of rotation yield similar results when dealing with relatively "clean" sets of survey items; that is, groups of survey items that have a high degree of within-group correlation (high within-group factor loadings) and a low degree of between-group correlation (low betweengroup factor loadings).
5. Calculating reliabilities (or "alphas") is a counterpart to exploratory factor analysis: any group of survey items that has high within-group correlation (factor loadings) usually has high reliability (alpha). The rule of thumb that has emerged over time with organizational behavioral research is to view constructs with alphas of .70 or higher as acceptable. It should be noted, however, that there is a direct analogy between this guideline and the guideline regarding "acceptable" p-values for hypothesis testing: though .05 has emerged over time as the dominant p-value cutoff used by most researchers, important information is conveyed by p-values in the .10 to .05 range, and in the .05 to .01 range. It is approximate, but reasonable, to say that the analogy to a p-value of .10 is an alpha of .60, while the analogy to a p-value of .01 is an alpha of .80 (or even .90).
Resource commitment:
Similar to the previous construct, but focused broadly on any type of resource the team might need to be effective.
6. Individual and team rewards: Finding the right balance of individual versus group-based rewards is a key challenge when designing teams. This construct measures the extent to which the person perceives adequate alignment of rewards at both the individual and group level with both the individual's and the team's efforts and contributions.
7. Measurable outcomes: Having measurable outcomes should make it easier for team members to focus their efforts on actions that enhance effectiveness.
Team networking:
Measures the extent to which the team works with other people in the company that can help it achieve its objectives.
9. Group leadership: Measures team member attitudes regarding leaders' roles in facilitating the team's work.
Team cohesion:
Measures the extent of confl ict among members of the team.
11. Intention to leave: A precursor to turnover, intention to leave has been shown to be a fairly reliable predictor in a number of settings.
12. Pay satisfaction: An attitudinal measure of whether the person is receiving wages at or above the reservation wage.
13. Job satisfaction: Though economists typically focus solely on the wage or total monetary compensation, models of job matching can be easily enhanced to include search for nonmonetary aspects in addition to monetary ones. This construct measures the overall quality of the match across all job aspects.
14. Career satisfaction: In addition to point-in-time issues related to a job match, the job may provide opportunities for career advancement through skill building that is needed for subsequent jobs.
15. Development support: On-the-job learning is a conscious activity that typically is acknowledged by economists only in the guise of formal training. However, the organizational behavioral literature has long recognized that there are active processes in which the employee can engage, including working with mentors and getting feedback on ways to improve skills on the job. This construct addresses those issues.
16. Work-life imbalance: Economic models of the labor market rarely address hours constraints, except in the constant of dual job holding (Paxson and Sicherman 1996) . Such models focus on binding upper limits on hours worked that are created by overtime laws. Virtually ignored is the issue of binding lower limits on hours worked, something that has been noted in the nonacademic literature as a concern for professional workers (Schor 1991) , and which has been addressed in the organizational behavioral literature as work-life imbalance.
For the effectiveness measures, the respondents were asked to rate their team along seven dimensions: (i) overall, (ii) quality, (iii) speed, (iv) cost, (v) technical performance, (vi) innovation, and (vii) customer satisfaction, using a 0 to 100 scale. These measures were initially identifi ed as candidates based on a review of the teams literature, and were subsequently verifi ed during the interviews with the senior executives of the company. To check the accuracy of the team members' perspectives, senior level managers (who did not take the survey) familiar with the team's objectives and processes were asked to rate the teams using the same effectiveness measures. These individual ratings were combined with those of the on-site managers to produce team-level aggregate (mean) manager ratings, which were compared to team-level aggregate employee ratings. The correlation between the manager and employee means across the seven outcome measures and fi fteen teams was .41, which indicates a reasonable amount of agreement. While we would have preferred even greater consistency between manager and employee ratings of team effectiveness, given the small sample size we opted for combining the employee and on-site manager data when conducting the regression analyses. Because the on-site managers were active team members, including writing software computer code side-by-side with the nonmanagers, including their observations in the analysis seems warranted.
Results

Why did the company conduct software development work in these locations?
Interview results: The interviews with the fi rm's senior leaders indicated that seeking lower labor costs for software development work was one reason for moving such work overseas, though proximity to customers and acquisitions strategies played comparable if not larger roles. The company's headquarters is in the United States and much of its U.S.-based software development work is located in traditional centers of technology industry concentration, including the Bay Area in Northern California, Massachusetts, and Texas. When the company fi rst set up operations in Western Europe, the initial offices had software sales and customer support responsibility only. In subsequent years, some of the end-stage development work was moved to Western Europe, including offices in France and Ireland. This included localization, which means adapting the software program to meet local language and other preferences. In keeping with the principles of distributed work, these end-stage processes are self-contained in the sense that they typically can be performed by stand-alone teams in the target countries with equal or better performance than if such work were performed closer to headquarters in the United States.
The success with moving end-stage software development work to Western Europe suggested to the fi rm's senior leadership that it might be feasible to move some of the earlier-stage development work as well. Aside from proximity to customers, the leadership perceived labor quality that was comparable to that available in the United States, with labor costs that were below those in the United States. 6 The perceptions of labor quality came both from organic growth (hiring of additional software development engineers to work on existing products) and from acquisitions. In the case of Norway and the Czech Republic, part of the reason for the company's presence was due to acquiring companies based in those countries that had software products the U.S. company wanted to integrate into its own product offerings. In these cases, opening and maintaining "official" company operations offered the greatest chance of retaining the acquired fi rms' founders and employees, who were critical to the success of the integrated products. Thus, expansion in Western and Eastern Europe occurred both incrementally and in discrete jumps.
Incremental expansion only continued, however, as the company became adept at managing the work being done remotely. In each case, as a new site was established abroad, there was an initial learning curve regarding the best way to set up the technology and communications infrastructure, learn the local laws and labor regulations, and iron out the kinks of managing work that was being conducted many time zones away. Consistent with the literature on distributed teams (Gibson and Cohen 2003) , the company learned the hard way the benefi ts of bringing team members together for face-to-face (FTF) meetings to establish trust, shared understanding, and integration among members working across large time, space, and culture differences. It also learned the need for ongoing FTF work by both team members and managers at regular intervals, which is accomplished by bringing people together at both the U.S. and abroad sites, depending on the stage of work and other considerations such as enabling the abroad team members to develop relationships with senior leaders in the United States, which both facilitates the team achieving its objectives and the individuals' ability to advance their careers within the fi rm.
With the perceived successful operation of software development sites in Western Europe, the company gained confi dence that it could use its expertise in distributed software development to pursue even lower labor costs in India and China. In both of those cases, labor costs appear to have been more of a primary motivation than they were for the expansion into Western Europe. Interestingly, though, anecdotal evidence suggests that with the rapid expansion of outsourcing and software development work, particularly in India, labor costs have been rising much faster there in recent years than in the United States or Western Europe, eroding some, though hardly all, of the labor cost advantages. This apparently was the case with the site in Ireland, which started out with lower labor costs than the United 6. Historical data on labor cost differences was not available. However, the senior leaders' recollection is that the labor cost differences in the early years produced savings that were signifi cant, though nowhere near as much as the current labor cost differences with Eastern Europe (approximately 50 percent of U.S. labor costs), India, and China (both approximately 33 percent of U.S. labor costs).
States, but by the time of the study had labor costs within 90 percent of the United States.
Are Interview results: Labor cost differences are only one factor, albeit an important one, that impacts site performance. The other main benefi t that emerged from the interviews was access to talent (skills) that are comparable or even better than the average talent available in the United States. Countering these advantages are the higher nonlabor costs from doing work over large distances. Because all software components produced abroad by this company eventually have to be integrated back into the components produced in the United States, the costs of coordinating and integrating the work produced at remote sites is greater than at sites in the United States.
A key factor in the higher integration costs is lack of overlap of the standard workday. For the Western European and California sites, there is only about one hour of overlap at the end of the day in Europe and the beginning of the day in California, during which all synchronous problem solving has to take place. This creates a signifi cant burden on the team members who play the integrating roles, which can impact their job and career satisfaction, not to mention their productivity. The story that emerged from the interviews is that these employees do whatever it takes to get the work done (including sacrifi cing time with family and friends to work either late at night or early in the morning), but that they are subject to potentially greater burnout and turnover than the other employees.
Despite these difficulties, employees on both sides of the Atlantic who discussed their frustrations with the small overlap in the working day also said that they managed to work through the problems, fi nding a manageable equilibrium for the most part. Those on teams with members in California and India, in contrast, had no such equilibrium: the time difference is twelve hours, meaning that there is absolutely no overlap in the standard workday. The interviews suggested that these employees would be susceptible to the biggest imbalances between work and nonwork demands, with the highest potential for dissatisfaction and turnover.
Survey results: Descriptive statistics from the survey for each country are reported in table 7.1. The results of ANOVA tests for equality of each variable mean across the four countries are reported in the fi nal column. The fi rst seven rows report the outcome measures; the ANOVA results indicate that there is no statistically signifi cant difference in the team effectiveness measures across the different sites. The point estimates in some cases differ by more than a small amount (e.g., the France site mean for speed is 70.6 percent effectiveness, compared to 80.5 for the Czech Republic site), but the standard deviations are equally large. This indicates a signifi cant amount of within-site (and within-country, in the case of the United States, which 
has multiple sites) differences in effectiveness ratings. Separate anovas, not reported in the table, testing differences across the three main sites in the United States found a similar pattern of no statistically signifi cant differences in any of the effectiveness ratings ( p-value Ͼ .10 in each case). The results from analyzing the drivers of team effectiveness are presented in table 7.2. In each case the ten effectiveness drivers are regressed on the effectiveness measure in the fi rst stage, and then the indicators for degree of collaboration across time zones, distance from supervisor, and location are entered in the second stage.
The results in table 7 .2 indicate that the relationships between the effectiveness drivers and (perceived) outcome measures are consistent with the existing literature on teams. In particular, trust, intergroup cooperation, IT support, resource commitment, team networking, and team cohesion all are statistically signifi cantly positively related to at least one of the effectiveness measures. All of the coefficients are either statistically significantly positive or not signifi cantly different from zero; none are negative and statistically signifi cant.
The indicators for geographic dispersion and location do not provide much support for the notion that having the software development work located in far-fl ung locations negatively impacts team effectiveness. Having to regularly communicate with team members either four to seven or eight or more time zones away does not appear to impact effectiveness, relative to those who do not regularly communicate with team members , whereas team members in both the Czech Republic and in India report higher resource commitment than the software engineers located at the company's headquarters. 7 With the company focusing so heavily on trying to make things work for team members located on different continents, the results in tables 7.1 and 7.2 suggest that they may be missing an opportunity to improve performance by mending the fences that are much closer to home (i.e., those who are in the same time zone but not located at headquarters).
Very few of the location indicators are signifi cant in table 7.2. Team members in France 8 report lower speed and innovation, which is consistent with the interviews. Some of the U.S.-based leadership expressed high degrees of satisfaction with the French sites' quality, but low satisfaction with their responsiveness. The Czech Republic site, in contrast, was viewed as having software engineers who were less complacent, more "hungry" to succeed regardless of the personal sacrifi ces that might be needed. Perhaps in part because of this, the respondents at the Czech Republic site reported higher cost effectiveness. They also, however, reported lower customer satisfaction; their drive to succeed within the cost parameters thus may produce unintended costs downstream with lower sales. This story is consistent with one senior leadership interviewee who expressed frustration at what appeared to be an ongoing need to have senior technical experts in the United States intervene in the Czech Republic team's work to fi x problems that occurred with higher frequency than other sites such as France.
At this point it is worth noting the impact of both IT and HR practices in impacting effectiveness for these teams. For IT support, at fi rst glance it may seem surprising that variation in this is related to effectiveness only on the cost and technical performance fronts. Yet this company, like most, strives for consistency in practices across sites within the same business unit; if a certain level of technology support is provided in the United States because 7 . Note, however, that this effect only exists for those who are located in India and the Czech Republic who do not have to communicate on a regular basis with team members in the United States-the coefficients on communicating with team members both four to seven and eight or more time zones away are negative and signifi cant.
8. The indicator in the tables is for team members in either France or Norway; however, the vast majority of these are in France so those respondents undoubtedly dominate the estimated relationships. that is what it takes to get the job done, the expectation of the company's leaders is that the same level of support will be provided at all sites. Thus, within-company analyses such as these often suffer from a range restriction problem: most employees should experience much lower variation in practices within a company than if we were to compare employees across companies.
For HR practices the range restriction issue may be less stark, but still important. Range restriction is an issue because the desire to promote common ways of communicating and rewarding performance lead to consistency of HR practices across sites. The need to do some adaptation to local preferences, however, has the potential to introduce more variation in HR practices than might be expected for IT support. For the French site, in particular, the national restrictions on fi ring have signifi cantly impacted how the company uses the site. Initially there was no expectation that a downturn in business would lead to headcount adjustment problems in France. Yet this is precisely what happened a few years prior to the study, when the company tried to remove costs at many of its sites around the globe in response to a business downturn. The difficulties in laying off software engineers in France led the company to manage the site differently, focusing on keeping headcount the same or even falling through natural attrition. Yet despite this emphasis, the French site continues to be given highly technical components of the work in no small part because of the stability of the employees and their high level of expertise. Thus, both IT and HR practices appear to matter, but in ways that do not necessarily impact measured productivity at a single point in time, as these data do.
Moving to the attitudinal data, table 7.4 reports the correlation of overall team effectiveness with the intention to leave, satisfaction, perceived development support, and work-life imbalance variables. As expected, and consistent with previous research, there is a reasonably large positive correlation with satisfaction and development support, and negative correlation with intention to leave. As Lawler (2003) has argued, these results are consistent with mutually reinforcing HR practices and employee actions: a supportive environment creates the conditions for effective performance, which makes it easier for the fi rm to spend money and take the time to do things to keep its employees happy, which improves retention, which helps performance, and so forth. This perspective is further supported by the results in table 7.5, which show a strong negative correlation between intentions to leave the fi rm and satisfaction, development support, and work-life balance (column [1] ), regardless of how geographically dispersed the team members are (column [2] ).
Finally, the results in table 7 .6 indicate that geographic dispersion of team members is not related to satisfaction, development support, or work-life imbalance. The one difference that stands out is for team members located in India, who reported lower pay satisfaction and job satisfaction. This is consistent with anecdotes that wages are rising relatively fast in India. The results indicate that the fi rm's HR policies regarding pay may not be responding quickly enough to changes in the external environment.
What are the prospects for future software development work in these locations? The survey results indicated that, on average, there are not many differences in reported effectiveness for work that is done at the different sites. This, in large part, likely is due to the interdependent nature of work that takes place not just at those sites, but in the United States as well. Given the company's strong preference for making overall product decisions and doing the fi nal integration work in the United States, it is hard to foresee a scenario in which such integration costs could be lowered without a major shift in the way overall product development decisions are made. Thus, to the extent that the company continues to do this kind of software development work in general, the data and interviews suggest that there is no reason to expect a pullback from working in these regions.
That said, the desire to seek lower labor costs suggests that future growth in software engineering headcount is liable to take place in the Czech Republic, India, and China. On the one hand, at the time of the study the Czech Republic's labor costs were about one half those in the United States, whereas the labor costs in India and China were lower, at about one third those in the United States. Countering the lower labor costs of India and China, however, the Czech Republic is closer to the United States, which makes synchronous communication much easier to do, even if it is concentrated at the end of the day in Europe and beginning of the day in the United States. This suggests that the type of work that is done in the Czech Republic may have greater complexity than the work that is done in India or Chinaunless the company moves toward allowing complete pieces of software to be developed in those sites that are the furthest removed from headquarters. In France, the prospects appear to be continued work, but no expansion in the number of software engineers, and thus a low or diminished profi le with respect to the company's overall software development efforts. Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * * * Signifi cant at the 1 percent level. * * Signifi cant at the 5 percent level. * Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
Conclusions
This study has found evidence in favor of the following conclusions:
1. International differences in productivity do not appear to be a big factor in explaining cross-sectional patterns of software development work location.
2. To the extent that geographic dispersion matters, spreading work out to the point where there is no overlap in the standard workday may put limits on the productivity of individual team members. However, the teams as a whole appear capable of dealing with such pressures without signifi cantly impacting the teams' overall effectiveness.
3. Even though the data did not reveal average productivity differences across sites, this says nothing about marginal productivity differences. Given a set of strengths and weaknesses associated with conducting software development work in various sites, one would expect the fi rm to distribute the work in such a way that average productivity (and contributions to profi t- 
